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REPUTATION AND THE CONTROL OF POLLUTION 
Arthur J. Caplan 
ABSTRACT 
111 
This paper investigates the effectiveness of reputation in inducing a polluting firm to self-
regulate its emissions when consumers have imperfect information. In particular, we ask to what 
extent must consumers reward and punish the firm before it chooses self-regulation as its 
dominant strategy? We find that if payoffs in the stage game are such that both the consumer and 
the polluting firm have beliefs that are consistent with each others' behaviors, then the firm has a 
positive probability of playing clean in each period of a finite game. Further, we find that a weak 
reward/punishment scheme may have an adverse effect on the environment, and that there are 
both environmental and welfare gains associated with strengthening the scheme. 
JEL Classification: D2I, D62, LSI 
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REPUTATION AND THE CONTROL OF POLLUTION l 
1. Introduction 
Is it possible to control pollution without the involvement of a regulator? On the surface, 
this question seems heretical. Even though the most appropriate type of regulation for any given 
pollution problem is still a topic of debate, both experience and theory seem to dictate some form 
of involvement by a regulatory authority. Indeed, the debate over environmental regulation is 
typically bounded by the hierarchical questions of: (1) under what conditions are market-based 
incentives more efficient than command-and-control standards; and (2) assuming that these 
conditions exist, then whether taxes, transfers, marketable permits, or some combination therein 
are the preferable mechanisms. As a result of this bounded debate, the basic question has yet to 
be adequately answered of whether there is a more radical alternative to the ideology of 
regulator-centric control than these market mechanisms. We show in this paper that such a 
theoretical alternative may exist. When an unregulated (i.e. "dirty") firm's reputation both 
matters and can be updated over time, repeated interactions between the firm and its consumers 
can lead to self-regulation (i.e. the dirty firm becomes "clean"), even when both the consumers 
and firm have imperfect information about each other's payoffs. 
We find that if payoffs are such that both the consumer and the polluting firm have 
beliefs that are consistent with each others' behaviors, then in a sequential equilibrium the firm 
has a positive probability of behaving clean in each period of a finite game. Further, a weak 
reward/punishment scheme (i.e. a scheme whereby the consumer does not effectively utilize 
information about the firm's previous emissions levels to alter his demand) may have an adverse 
IThe author thanks participants at the University of Colorado's Environmental and Resource Economics 
Workshop 2000 and at the 2001 Western Agricultural Economic Association Annual Meeting for insightful 
comments. 
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effect on the environment; thus there are both environmental and welfare gains associated with 
strengthening the scheme.2 This is good news, as it implies a less active, and ,presumably less 
costly, role for the regulating authority. Theoretically speaking, the authority's role might best be 
relegated to solely pollution monitoring and information dissemination, rather than promulgating 
technology standards, setting new tax rates, determining permit quotas, or making transfers (each 
of which typically invokes a weighty political process). 
Realistically, will consumers utilize information about firm-level emissions to alter their 
consumption decisions? How likely are polluting firms to believe that consumers will do so, and 
thus alter their emissions strategies?3 Empirical research devoted to answering these questions 
has thus far been too mixed to draw any steadfast conclusions.4 Concomitant with a relatively 
small amount of empirical research is a dearth of theoretical analysis. For instance, Kennedy 
et al. (1994) argue that due to market failure, there is a role for public information provision ifno 
other policy instruments are available. In their paper, market failure arises from an unpriced 
external benefit associated with an "information purchase" by any given consumer, which in turn 
leads the market to under-provide information. What ultimately matters, however, is how firm-
not consumer-behavior is changed through information provision. Further, Kennedy et al. 's 
2 As will be discussed in greater detail in Section 5, "strength" in this sense implies not only the type of 
infonnation provided to consumers by the monitoring authorities, but also the inclination of consumers to use this 
infonnation to distinguish between clean and dirty fIrms. 
3Several studies have confIrmed that investor reactions to the release of pollution data and announcements 
of lawsuits and suit settlements can significantly reduce stock market returns for polluting fInns. For instance, see 
Lanoie, et al. (1998), Konar and Cohen (1997), Badrinath and Bolster (1996), Hamilton (1995), and Laplante and 
Lanoie (1994). 
4For examples, see Nimon and Beghin's (1999) analysis of the retail apparel industry, Foulon et al. 's (2000) 
study of the public disclosure strategy adopted by the province of British Columbia in Canada, and Arora and 
Cason's (1995) study of the EPA's 33/50 program to encourage voluntary reductions in toxic-releases. 
model is static and thus incapable of addressing the overriding question of how firm behavior 
changes over time in response to information provision. 
The framework adopted by Cavaliere (2000) is directed toward answering this question, 
and comes closest to the sequential-equilibrium concept used in the present paper. Cavaliere 
considers the interactions between a monopolist and a consumer who choose environmental 
quality with imperfect information. His model is developed for the two-period case. The firm's 
dominant strategy in the second period is to produce the dirty good, while consumers randomize 
between dirty and clean goods if the firm produced the clean good in the initial period. 
Randomization of consumer choices in the final period has a positive effect on the firm's two-
period payoffs, thus it may be in the firm's interest to produce the clean good in the first period 
and therefore gain the reputation of being a clean firm. A shortcoming of Cavaliere's model is 
its inability to extrapolate beyond the two-period case and thus test whether or not-and for how 
many periods-a dirty firm might enhance its reputation by choosing self-regulation as its 
dominant strategy. Our model builds on Cavaliere's by developing a more general repeated-
game framework that extends beyond two periods. 
Another interesting paper, by Arora and Gangopadhyay (1995), offers a theoretical 
explanation for why some firms over-comply with minimum environmental standards. Using a 
full-information two-stage duopoly model, where in the first stage firms choose their level of 
cleanup and in the second stage they engage in price competition, the authors show that an a 
priori clean firm will over-comply when the following two conditions hold. First, due to a 
presumed availability of public information, consumers are able to perfectly distinguish between 
the clean and dirty firms based on their respective levels of cleanup. Second, an income 
3 
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differential among consumers is sufficient to support demand for cleaner products at higher 
prices (i.e. the market is segmented by income level). Arora and Gangopadhyay find that 
publicly provided information can induce more cleanup by some firms when that information 
enables consumers to perfectly determine the emissions behavior of firms. 5 
Applying Backus and Driffill's (1985) repeated-game solution technique to the problem 
of environmental regulation, we find that under certain circumstances a polluting firm selects 
self-regulation as its dominant strategy merely by internalizing the forward effect of its reputation 
as a clean or dirty firm (or, in terms of Arora and Gangopadhyay, the dirty firm voluntarily 
overcomplies). Unlike in Arora and Gangopadhyay, this result occurs without consumers having 
perfect information. Rather, consumers are uncertain of the actual intentions of the firm, and 
therefore must rely solely on the firm's past behavior in updating their beliefs about the future. 
Further, a segmented market is unnecessary for self-regulation. 
The sequential-equilibrium framework enables us to show under what circumstances a 
firm is induced by an uncertain consumer to consider the reputational effects of its current and 
future emissions levels, while satisfying the property of dynamic consistency. 'In other words, the 
fum always finds it optimal to stick to its initial plan, whether or not the plan involves becoming 
clean.6 
5Harrington (1998) also fmds a theoretical justification for over-compliance. In his repeated-game model, 
overcompliance occurs in the sense that a firm may have an incentive to comply with regulations even though its 
compliance cost each period exceeds the expected penalty for violation. What drives this result is the ability of the 
regulator to segment its enforcement policies into low (i.e., nonaggressive) and high (i.e., aggressive) categories. A 
firm currently in the high category therefore has incentive to comply, regardless of its compliance costs, in order to 
be returned to the low category. 
6Kreps and Wilson (1982a) show that this result holds only for perfect and plausible strategies. The 
property of dynamic consistency is what Harrington (1988) calls a stationary policy. 
5 
Previous studies using static models have offered compelling rules that minimize the role 
of the regulatory authority in controlling pollution, but these rules do not portend to minimize the 
regulator's role as substantially as that which evolves from the sequential equilibrium 
investigated here.7 A plethora of regulator-centric dynamic solutions have also been proposed in 
the literature.8 However, despite their prescriptions of relatively simple regulatory rules that can 
lead to reduced levels of pollution, none of these studies consider an equilibrium solution that 
relies entirely on uncertain consumers' abilities to induce self-regulation on the part of the 
polluting fIrm. As this paper shows, the mechanism of providing consumers with enough (albeit 
imperfect) information to distinguish between clean and dirty fIrms can be, theoretically 
speaking, adequate enough to control pollution. The regulator's goal is solely to provide 
consumers with information about the fInn's emissions rates; information that enables the 
consumer to form a reputation that is consistent with the fIrm's performance over time. 
The next section provides a brief overview of current policies that rely on information 
provision and reputation formation. Section 3 introduces the basic model and discusses its 
equilibrium properties. Section 4 provides examples of how sequential equilibria are determined 
for two important cases. Section 5 calibrates the model and solves for its sequential equilibria 
under three different information scenarios. Section 6 summarizes and discusses the various 
policy implications of the analysis. 
7c.f. Comes and Silva (1999), Varian (1994), and Porter (1988). 
8Studies that concentrate on fIrst-best mechanisms include Benchekroun and van Long (1998), Baron and 
Besanko (1984), Spulber (1988), Xepapadeas (1991, 1992), Dockner and van Long (1993), Chichilnisky and Heal 
(1993), and Loehman and Dinar (1994). Studies either concentrating more or exclusively on second-best outcomes 
include Jones and Scotchmer (1990), Kambhu (1990), Hoel (1991), Egteren (1992), Lewis and Sappington (1992), 
and Garvie and Keeler (1994). Caillaud et al. (1988) provide a comprehensive survey of the literature on regulation 
under asymmetric information. 
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2. Policy Background 
How feasible is a shift away from the current regulator-centric paradigm toward self-
regulation? If recent experience is any guide, then it might be feasible for certain classes of 
externalities under certain market structures. For example, U.S. federal law inandates that the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) compile information on toxic chemical pollution 
nationwide in what is known as the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI). Approximately 650 
chemicals have thus far been designated for reports under TRI, resulting in approximately 73,000 
reports being submitted in 1996 by 21,000 manufacturing facilities and 200 federal facilities 
(EPA 2000; Graham and Miller 2001). TRI information is easily retrievable from the EPA's web 
site, as well as from the Environmental Defense's (ED) "Scorecard" link (ED, 2000).9 This 
information enables consumers to track toxic releases of manufacturing firms into local air- and 
watersheds, and can therefore shape the reputations that consumers hold of various firms. The 
EPA has recognized for several years that its role is not only to enforce environmental laws, but 
also to provide citizens with useful information that will assist them in shifting their consumption 
habits away from "dirty" goods and polluting firms (EPA 1988 & 1996). 
The feasibility of a shift away from the regulator-centric paradigm has similarly been 
tested during the past few decades by a growing number of DECD countries, through their 
experiments with eco-labeling. 10 According to the DECD (1997), eco-Iabeling has been 
moderately successful with the individual consumer, although public awareness and attitudes 
9TRI data has also been disseminated through other EPA programs, such as the 33/50 program (Arora and 
Cason 1995), and a variety of popular press outlets (Hamilton 1995). 
I°Among the more notable eco-Iabeling programs are the EU Eco-Label Award Scheme, the Nordic Swan, 
the Swedish Environmental Choice Programme, the Canadian Environmental Choice Programme, the German Blue 
Angel Scheme, the Japanese Eco-Mark, and the French NF Environnment (OECD 1991). 
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toward eco-labeled products vary significantly across countries and across demographic groups 
within countries. Also, the various types of eco-labels are believed to have differential impacts 
on consumer behavior. For instance, Type I labels are government-supported, third-party 
certification schemes that "apply to a small proportion of products in a product category which 
are determined to have lessened adverse environmental impacts (OECD 1997)." Type II labels 
are informative self-declaration environmental claims made by manufacturers, and Type III labels 
are quantified product information based upon independent verification. Because it is based 
upon a more rigorous distinction of what is a "clean" product, a Type I label should, all else 
equal, have a stronger impact on consumer behavior than either Type II or Type III labels. 
According to the OECD, eco-labeling has become a popular tool to promote environmentally 
preferable consumption and production patterns. This popularity points to the potential of using 
information to form reputations of specific companies; reputations that might govern the 
companies' future emissions strategies. 11 
3. The Basic Model 
Payoffs for each period t of a finite game played between a consumer and any given firm 
are expressed symbolically in Table 1, where the superscripts on Jr (profit) and U (utility) denote 
the four possible outcomes (e.g,. superscript 1 denotes the outcome when the firm behaves clean, 
but the consumer believes that the firm is dirty; superscript 2 denotes the outcome when the firm 
I I Although not as fonnal as the OEeD's eco-Iabeling schemes, evidence from lower-income countries also 
points to how reputation fonnation can govern fIrm behavior. For example, in their study of water pollution in 
Indonesia, Pargal and Wheeler (1996) fmd that even in the absence of any fonnal regulation, factory-level water 
pollution is responsive to variables such as local employment shares, population density, worker education and 
income levels; variables which the authors believe reflect the typical factory's concern about its reputation. In their 
study of traditional Mexican brickmakers, Blackman and Bannister (1998) fmd that "community pressure" can 
motivate dirty fIrms to adopt clean technologies, similarly implying a strong reputation effect. 
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behaves clean and the consumer believes the finn is clean, etc.).12 For now, we can safely 
assume that a matrix of actual payoffs indeed exists, which is determined by (1) the quality of 
infonnation provided to the consumer about the finn, (2) the extent to which the consumer 
utilizes the infonnation, and (3) the extent to which the finn responds to what it perceives as its 
reputation (defined in detail below). In Section 5, we suggest a simple general-equilibrium 
model that yields payoff matrices for different assumptions about these three detenninants. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
It is assumed that neither the consumer nor the finn have common knowledge about the 
payoffs in Table 1. While the two players know their own respective payoffs, they do not know 
each other's. However, should it play dirty in any period t, then similar to Kreps and Wilson 
(1982b) and Backus and Driffill (1985), we assume that the finn's reputation is blown. In this 
case, the consumer believes with certainty that the finn is dirty and thus the payoff in cell (;r3, 
U3) obtains in all future periods. 
As indicated in Table 1, the finn's strategy set includes two possible actions in any period 
t-behave clean or dirty. For example, behaving clean might entail voluntary abatement or a 
self-tax on emissions, while behaving dirty would reflect an absence of these types of actions. 
The finn can therefore be thought of as choosing a behavioral strategy over these two actions, 
which maximizes its cumulative expected profit across periods t = 1, ... , T. 
The consumer's strategy set reflects the level of expected finn cleanliness-entirely clean 
or entirely dirty. This is an obvious abstraction from reality, where consumers may have a 
continuum of expected cleanliness levels in their strategy sets (e.g., various levels of partial 
J2Since payoffs are constant across periods (as opposed to expected payoffs, which vary period-by-period) 
we have dropped the subscript t from Jr and U in Table 1. 
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cleanliness), but one that without loss of generality greatly reduces the complexity of the ensuing 
games described below. An additional simplification in this model is the definition of the 
consumer's strategy set over beliefs rather than specific actions per se, such as actual purchasing 
decisions. Since a consumer's actual purchasing decisions can reasonably be considered as 
perfectly determined by her beliefs, there is no loss of generality in defining her strategy set 
directly over her beliefs. Further, there is a considerable gain in focus on what characterizes firm 
behavior in a sequential equilibrium. 13 Therefore, in this framework the consumer chooses a 
behavioral strategy over her two beliefs about the firm's level of cleanliness that maximizes her 
cumulative expected utility across periods t = 1, ... , T. 
Similar to the sub-game perfect equilibrium concept for [mite multi-stage games, a 
sequential equilibrium is solved by backward induction, beginning with the final period T. An 
equilibrium is characterized as a set of probabilities and corresponding beliefs and actions for the 
consumer and firm, respectively, such that neither agent has any incentive to deviate from his 
behavioral strategy in any period of the game (i.e., the strategies are sequentially rational). To 
find the sequential equilibrium for this game, we first define the following two probabilities: 
Zt = the probability that the consumer believes the firm is clean in a mixed strategy; Yt = the 
probability that the firm plays clean in a mixed strategy. The firm's reputation in period t, Pt' is 
then the probability that the firm is clean in period t given the history of the game up to this 
point. 14 Similarly, the firm's reputation in period t + 1, Pt+ l' is the probability that the firm is 
13Backus and Driffill (1985) assume a similar strategy set for the consumer in their model of government 
behavior, where the consumer's actions in any period t are his beliefs, or expectations, about inflation. 
14This can alternatively be thought of as the joint probability that the firm is clean going into period t and 
that it will play clean in period t. 
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clean going into period t+ 1 given that it has behaved clean up to period t (therefore, Pt+l reflects 
the change, or update, in the consumer's belief that the finn is clean as the game proceeds from 
period t to t+ 1). By Bayes Rule, we therefore have 
(1) 
where qt = Pt + (1 - Pt)Yt represents the fact that the marginal probability of the finn playing clean 
in period t is a weighted sum of the probabilities of the finn being clean (Pt) and not being clean 
but nevertheless having a probability associated with playing clean that period ((1 - Pt)yJ At 
each stage of the game, therefore, the consumer's and finn's strategies specify respective 
probabilities over beliefs and actions as functions of reputation. 
Using the payoffs in Table 1, we are able to calculate the expected final-period Tpayoffs 
to the consumer and the finn, respectively, as 
Ey{U) = U( Zy; py; 1) (2 a) 
Ey{ Jr) = n{yy; Zy; 1) (2b) 
where the respective variable sets {Zy; PT} and {Zy; YT} enter linearly in the consumer's and finn's 
period T expected payoffs. IS From (2a), the consumer plays 
1
1 if Uz > 0 
Zr = 00 < Zr < 1 if Uz = 0 
if Uz < 0 
(3) 
for any given PT' where the sub-scripted letter on function U represents the partial derivative with 
respect to that letter. In other words, if Ey{U) is increasing in ZT' then in the game's final period 
15The specific payoffs from each of the cells in Table 1 are subsumed in expressions (2a) and (2b), and all 
other expressions for expected utility and profit that follow. 
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the consumer will believe that the finn is clean with certainty. If E-/U) is decreasing in Zr, then 
in the final period the consumer will believe that the finn is dirty with certainty. Only when Pr is 
such that E-/U) is unaffected by changes in Zr will the consumer randomize in period T. 
Similarly, from (2b) the finn plays 
(4) 
for any given Zr. In other words, if E-/ Jr) is increasing in Yn then in the game's final period the 
finn behaves clean with certainty. If E-/ Jr) is decreasing in Yr, then in the final period the fum 
behaves dirty with certainty. Only when Zr is such that E-/ Jr) is unaffected by changes in Yr will 
the finn randomize in period T. 
Moving backward one period to T - 1, the expected two-period payoffs to the consumer 
and finn, respectively, are: 
(5a) 
(5b) 
where the respective variable sets {zr-l' Pr-l} and {Yr-l' Pr} enter linearly in the consumer's and 
finn's period T-l expected two-period payoffs. Thus, the same conditions as expressed in (3) 
and (4) for period Tapply respectively to the consumer and finn in period T-l, which generalizes 
for each period t. These results are summarized conveniently in the following two theorems. 
Theorem 1: If Pt is such that E/U) is increasing in Zt' then in period t the consumer believes 
that the firm is clean with certainty. If Pt is such that E/U) is decreasing in Zt' 
then in period t the consumer believes that the firm is dirty with certainty. If Pt is 
such that E/U) is unaffected by changes in Zt the consumer randomizes in period 
t. 
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Theorem 2: If Zt is such that E/7r} is increasing in Yt' then in period t the firm behaves clean 
with certainty. If Zt is such that E/7r} is decreasing in Yt' then in period t the firm 
behaves dirty with certainty. If Zt is such that E/7r} is unaffected by changes in Yt 
the firm randomizes in period t. 
Theorems 1 and 2 are important for two reasons. First, together they provide a straight-
forward method for determining a sequential equilibrium. Second, they clearly demonstrate the 
role played by reputation in determining the mixed strategies adopted by the consumer and the 
firm. From Theorem 1, we see that the consumer's strategy is directly dependent on the firm's 
reputation. From Theorem 2, we see that the firm's strategy is indirectly tied to its reputation 
through its effect on the consumer's strategy. These relationships make intuitive sense. The best 
the consumer can do vis-a.-vis the firm is to base his strategy on the firm's rep~tation, which 
itselfis determined by the firm's previous behavior. Knowing solely its own payoff matrix, the 
best the firm can do vis-a.-vis the consumer is to base its strategy on the probabilities associated 
with the consumer's mixed strategy. The following examples will help illuminate this intuition. 
4. Examples of A Sequential Equilibrium 
Table 2 describes the 9 possible strategies that a consumer and firm might follow. These 
strategies result in a total of 81 possible stage games that might be played between the two. For 
example, the consumer might select her strategy A (the firm is always expected to be dirty) and 
the firm might select its strategy A (always behave dirty), resulting in stage game AA; or the 
consumer might select strategy B (the firm is always expected to be clean) and the firm might 
remain with strategy A, resulting in state game BA, etc. 
[INSERT TABLE 2] 
For the consumer, strategy C is most interesting. This is due to the fact that strategy C 
best reflects a consumer's ability to adjust his beliefs in a way that is consistent with new 
13 
information. 16 For the firm, strategies A and C are most interesting. Strategy.A reflects a 
dominant strategy to behave dirty. Under this strategy, the firm is a priori least likely to alter its 
behavior in repeated play, and thus least likely to be concerned about its reputation. Strategy C 
reflects more of a willingness on the part of the firm to alter its behavior in ~ manner that is 
consistent with the consumer's beliefs. In this section, we therefore restrict our attention to 
games CA and CC.17 
3.1 Game CA 
Suppose the period-by-period equilibrium payoffs for each agent are as expressed in 
Table 3. 18 Accordingly, the firm's dominant strategy is to behave dirty. However, the consumer 
does not have a dominant strategy. He believes that the firm is dirty when it plays dirty, and that 
the firm is clean when it plays clean. Table 3 may now be used to calculate the sequentially 
rational strategies for each agent. 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
Using (2b), the firm's expected fmal-period Tpayoffis: 
Ey{Jr) =zJyy{O) + (1 - YT)(l)] + (1 - ZT)[YY{O) + (1 - YT)(l)] = 1 :. YT. (6) 
Since Ey{~) is decreasing in YT for any value of ZT' we know by Theorem 2 that YT = O. Thus, the 
firm behaves dirty in the final period with certainty. 
16Strategies A, B, E, G, and I imply either no or only partial adjustment on the part of~e consumer. 
Strategies D, F, and H imply adjustments that are either wholly or partially inconsistent with new information. 
I7Strategy D for the fIrm is also of interest. It reflects a willingness on the part of the fIrm to alter its 
behavior in a manner that is inconsistent with the consumer's beliefs. Due to space restrictions, we do not present 
results for game CD. However, these results are available from the author upon request. 
18These payoff values have been arbitrarily selected for the purpose of example only. They represent the 
minimum discrete values that are necessary for game CA. The results in this section do not qualitatively change if 
minimum continuous values are used to establish the respective games CA and CC. 
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Using (2a), the consumer's expected final-period Tpayoffis: 
EIJJ) = zyfpy(l) + (1 - Pr)(O)] + (1 - zr)[PY(O) + (1 - Pr)(l)] = 1 + Zr (2Pr - 1) - Pr. (7) 
Using Theorem 1 and (7), if Pr > 112 the consumer plays Zr = 1 (i.e., he believes the fum is clean 
with certainty); if Pr < 112 he plays Zr = 0 (i.e., believes the firm is dirty with certainty); and if 
Pr = 112, the consumer is indifferent about Zr. This result is conveniently expressed as: 19 
if Pr > 1/2 
if Pr = 1/2 
if Pr < 1/2 
(8) 
Taking these possible outcomes into account, the expected values to the firm "and the consumer, 
respectively, of playing the game in final period T are: 20 
Ey(n) = 1 (9a) 
Ey(U) = max(pl' 1 - Pr). (9b) 
In period T-1, the firm's expected two-period payoff is: 
The final term of this equality reflects the fact that if the firm behaves dirty in period T-1, which 
it does with probability (1 - Yr-l)' then its reputation is blown. The consumer therefore expects 
the firm to behave dirty in the final period, and the best that the firm can do is "to behave dirty, 
thus receiving a payoff of 1. The second-to-Iast term is the probability of the firm behaving clean 
19The result for Zr = 112 is really the result for E-/.zr), since ° ~ Zr ~ 1 when Pr = 112. 
2<Note that when the consumer believes the finn is clean with certainty, and thus sets Zr = 1, (7) reduces to 
the fIrst term in the max operator of (9b). When the consumer believes the fIrm is dirty with certainty, and thus sets 
Zr = 0, (7) reduces to the second term in the max operator of (9b). When the consumer is indifferent, and thus sets 
0< Zr < 1, (7) reduces to a value between the two terms in the max operator (9b). 
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in T-1, and thus collecting the associated payoff JZ( T, ZT' YT) in period T. The. expression reduces 
to: 
The consumer's expected two-period payoff is: 
where the final term reflects the fact that if the consumer does not believe the firm is clean in 
period T-1 (i.e. the firm's reputation is blown), then his payoff in the final period is 1 (see 
Table 3). The expression reduces to: 
Using Theorem 2 and (10), we see that the firm's dominant strategy is YT-I = 0, since 
Ey{ Jr) = 1. Using Theorem 1 and (11), we also see that ZT_I = 1 only when qT-I.> 112, and that 
o ~ ZT_I ~ 1 when qT-I = 1/2. Assuming the consumer believes the firm will behave clean in 
period T-1 with probabilitfl 
PT-l 
YT-l = 
1- PT-l 
(10) 
(11) 
(12) 
then given that qT-I = PT-I + (1 - PT-I)YT-I' PT-I > 114 ensures qT-I > 112. In other words, given the 
hypothetical payoffs in Table 2, as long as the finn's reputation is such that the probability is 
greater than 1/4 that the firm will behave clean in period T-1 given that it has behaved clean up to 
that point, the consumer will believe that the firm is' clean in T-1 with certainty. Using (1) and 
21This expression simply defmes YT-I as the odds ratio in favor of the fIrm behaving clean in period T-l. 
Recall that the consumer does not know (10) and thus does not know that the fIrm's dominant strategy in period T-l 
is to behave dirty. 
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(12), ° < PT-I ~ 112 implies that PT = 112, which implies that ° < ZT < 1, and PT-I > 112 implies 
that PT-I = PT' which implies ZT = 1. We therefore see that the consumer is either indifferent or 
believes with certainty that the firm is clean in period T, depending upon the firm's reputation in 
period T-1. 
This solution can be extended to earlier periods by recognizing that 
ET_j+I(7r) = j + YT_j+I(ET_j+i7r) - j), j = 3,4, ... , T (13a) 
j = 3, 4, ... ,T (13b) 
Recursively solving for ET-j+i 7r) shows that ET-j+i~) - j = -1, which, when accounting for 
our earlier results for periods T-1 and T, implies that 
YT-j = 0, j = 0, 1, ... , T-1 
ET_/7r) = j + 1, j = 0, 1, ... , T-1 
Using (14a), and the previous results for periods T-1 and T, we see that 
ifqT-j >112 
ifqT-j =112 
ifqT-j <112 
if PT-j ~ 1 I 2 
if PT _ j > 1 I 2 ' j = 0, 1, .... T-1 
(l4a) 
(14b) 
(15) 
where the second equality results directly from (1) and (12).22 Equations (14) and (15) may be 
summarized in the following proposition. 
Proposition 1: If payoffs in the stage game are such that a consumer has beliefs which 
are consistent with the firm's behavior, and the firm's dominant strategy is 
to behave dirty, then the firm will behave dirty every period in a finite 
game. 
Proposition 1 implies that when a dirty firm's dominant strategy is to behave dirty, a 
22Similar to footnote 18, the result for ZT_j = 112 is really the result for ET-iZT)' since 0 ~ Z T-j ~ 1 when 
q T -j = 112 and when PT-j > 112. 
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repeated game between the finn and a consumer-where the consumer builds a reputation about 
the finn based on the finn's past behavior-will not induce the finn to behave clean in any 
period. Thus, infonnation provision is not an effective regulatory instrument when conditions 
are such that the consumer mixes has consistent beliefs about the finn's behavior, and behaving 
dirty is the finn's dominant state-game strategy. 
This result extends to multiple periods Cavaliere's (2000) finding for a two-period game 
played between a monopolist and a consumer. In his model, Cavaliere adopts game CA and 
finds that under certain circumstances the finn may revert to clean production in the first period 
in order to gain a reputation as a clean finn; a reputation that it can then exploit by behaving dirty 
in the second period. What drives his result, and thus distinguishes it from Proposition 1 above, 
is the assumption in Cavaliere's model that the consumer builds prior beliefs not only on whether 
or not the monopoly finn will behave dirty, but also on whether or not the finn's production is 
constrained a priori to be clean, say by the threats of potential entry or environmental regulation. 
As long as the probability of this constraint is nonnegative, and the consumer incurs a loss when 
he incorrectly guesses that the finn will behave clean, the probability that an unconstrained finn 
will behave clean is also nonnegative. Therefore, what Proposition 1 implies in relation to 
Cavaliere's model is that without an additional potential constraint on its production behavior, 
the finn has no incentive in game CA to behave clean in any period. 
3.2 Game CC 
Suppose the period-by-period equilibrium payoffs for each agent are as expressed in 
Table 4. Accordingly, both the finn's and the consumer's strategies are consistent. As in the 
previous game, the consumer believes that the finn is dirty when it behaves dirty, and believes 
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that the frrm is clean when it behaves clean. Similarly, the firm's optimal strategy is to behave 
dirty when it is believed dirty and to behave clean when it is believed clean. Table 4 may now be 
used to calculate the sequentially rational strategy for the firm. 23 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
Using (2b) and reducing, the firm's expected final-period Tpayoffis: 
Using Theorems 1 and 2 we see immediately that the firm's period Tstrategy is:24 
and its period T payoff is: 
E T (1r) = {OI ~ 
if ZT > 1/2 
if zT = 1/2 , 
if ZT < 1/2 
E T (1ri ) ~ 1 
if PT >< 1 I 2 
if PT = 1 12 
(16) 
(17) 
(18) 
Therefore, from (17) we see that the firm will behave clean in period Twith probability YT > 0 
when ZT ~ 1/2. 
In period T-l, the firm's expected two-period payoff is: 
(19) 
It is straight-forward to show that the firm's strategy in period T-l is: 
23Since in this game the consumer's strategy is the same as in the previous game's, we report only the fInn's 
strategy and payoffs here. 
24Similar to ZT_j = 112 in (15), YT = 112 is really the result for EIYT)' since 0 ~ YT ~ 1 when ZT = 112. 
1 
Yr-l = 1/2 
o 
if ZT_l > 1/2 and Pr >< 1/2 or 
ZT_l > 1/2 and PT = 1/2 and zr-l 3 E r 1r> 2 - 2zr _1 , 
if ZT_l = 1/2 
if ZT_l < 1/2 
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(20) 
and its associated two-period payoff in T-l is: 
° < PT-l < 1/4 or PT-l > 1/2 
PT-l = 1/4 
1 / 4 < PT -1 :::; 1 / 2 
(21) 
Solving recursively for the firm's strategy in periods T -j,} = 2,3, ... , T-l we see that 
1 
YT-j = 1/2 
o 
if ZT_j > 1/2 and 0 < PT- j-l < 1/4 or PT- j-l > 1/2, or 
ZT_j > 1/2 and 1/4:::; PT-j-l :::; 1/2 and Zr_j 3 E T_j _11r > } + 1- 2zr _}" 
if ZT' = 1/2 
-J 
if Zr_j < 1/2 (22) 
The firm's expected}-period payoff over all periods} is therefore: 
E T/1r) =} + 1 - zr-j + Yr/2ZT-j - (;+1) + ET-j+l1r), } = 0,1, ... , T-l (23) 
These results are summarized in the following proposition. 
Proposition 2: If payoffs in the stage game are such that both the consumer and the firm 
have beliefs which are consistent with each others' behaviors, then the 
firm has a positive probability of behaving clean in each period of a finite 
game. 
Proposition 2 might therefore be thought of as a realistic lower bound on what the stage 
game strategy of the firm must be before it will have a nonnegative probability of behaving clean 
in a finitely repeated game. We say "realistic" under the assumption that publicly provided 
information can sustain an equilibrium where the consumer uses a mixed strategy that is 
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consistent with the firm's behavior, and that the firm simultaneously adopts a mixed strategy that 
is consistent with the consumer's beliefs. Further, it seems doubtful that a firm will behave clean 
with a positive probability in any equilibrium for a repeated game that is predicated on the firm 
having a dominant strategy of behaving dirty in the stage game. It also seems unrealistic to 
assume that a consumer and a firm would be willing to follow 'believe clean' and 'behave clean' 
as respective dominant strategies. Thus, not only are the consistent mixed strategies of 
Proposition 2 most realistic, they also result in the firm caring enough about its reputation to 
behave clean with a positive probability, even in the final period of a finite game with the 
consumer. 
5. A Numerical Example 
For this example, we assume that a consumer purchases private goods from two firms-
firms 1 and 2-to maximize her utility. Her preferences over these two goods (Xl from firm 1 
and X 2 from firm 2) and the given aggregate amount of net emissions of a common pollutant 
produced by the two firms, g, are represented by: 
U = ¢>xl + (1 - ¢)x2 - 0.5g, (24) 
subj ect to the budget constraint: 
Y + t( Jrl + Jr2) + w(ll + 12) = PIXI + PzX2. (25) 
where Y is an initial endowment, t is the dividend rate on firm profits, w is the equilibrium wage 
rate, and ( and Pi are the equilibrium amount of inelastically supplied labor to firm i and output 
price, respectively, i=l, 2. 
The utility weights ¢ are adjusted by the consumer to reflect information provided (say, 
by the regulator about the firm's level of cleanliness) at the beginning of the supergame. For 
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example, if the consumer learns through publicly provided information that fIrm 1 has become 
cleaner relative to fIrm 2, ceteris paribus, t/J will increase. The consumer therefore responds to 
the information by shifting more weight in her preference function to Xl and away from x2• This 
information might be "structured," whereby a regulator releases it as part of a clearly articulated 
strategy, rather than "unstructured" information of the type found in the popular press on a more 
ad hoc basis (Foul on et al. 2000). Or, in terms of the eco-Iabeling programs mentioned in the 
Introduction, the regulator might mandate Type I labels as opposed to Types IT and ill.25 The 
externality g = L; Xi - L; ai' where a i is fIrm i's level of pollution abatement. 
Firms 1 and 2 choose their respective Ii and ai to maximize their profIt functions, 
if clean 
if dirty 
subject to decreasing returns-to-scale technology in output Xi = .ji; , and convex costs in 
(26a) 
(26b) 
abatement a/. For this example, fIrm 1 is assumed 'time inconsistently' clean by "self-taxing" 
itself at 'fl > 0 per unit of aggregate emissions, and it internalizes the effects that both its output 
and abatement activities (i.e., its choice set) have on g in each period. This self-tax represents an 
additional expense that fIrm 1 incurs as a result of being more socially responsible and thus 
distinguishing itself as a "green" fIrm. Firm 2 may behave dirty or clean in any given period. If 
dirty, then fIrm 2 places no self-tax on the level of aggregate emissions. Likewise, it does not 
internalize the effects on g of its output and abatement. If clean, fIrm 2 mimics fIrm I-it 
25 As shown by Shapiro (1983), a parameter such as ¢ can be conveniently thought of as a policy variable 
that represents the extent of informational problems in the economy, and which can be influenced by the information-
provision activities of a regulator. 
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self-taxes at rate t"l > 0 and internalizes the effects on g of its output and abatement. 
Table 5 provides the specific parameter values adopted for this example. Given these 
parameter values, we are able to solve for stage-game equilibrium values for the set of 
(29).26 
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
We consider three information scenarios. These scenarios are delineated by the different 
values of ¢ chosen by the consumer. In the first scenario-for sake of example called the 
"unstructured" information scenario-we assume that the consumer does not have available 
certified information about firm-specific emissions, and thus does not greatly reward (in a 
relative sense) firm 2 for behaving clean.27 Similarly, the consumer does not severely punish the 
firm 2 for behaving dirty. In this case, when firm 2 behaves clean and he believes firm 2 is clean 
(cell (n,/, U2) in Table 1), the consumer nonetheless chooses a relatively high value for ¢ (thus 
providing little reward to firm 2 in a relative sense). However, when firm 2 behaves dirty and he 
believes firm 2 is dirty (cell (1(23, U3) in Table 1), the consumer chooses a relatively low value for 
¢ (thus providing little punishment to firm 2). 
In the second scenario-called the "intermediate" information scenario-we assume that 
the consumer presumably has available some mix of structured and unstructured information 
26Mathematica (version 3) was used to solve the system represented by equations (24)-(26) and Tables 5 
and 6. The output for each of the scenarios presented in this section is available upon request from the author. 
27Recall that "unstructured" information is of the type found in the popular press on a more ad hoc basis 
(Foulon et al. 2000). Of course, this scenario could evolve for another reason-the consumer has "structured" 
information available, but for whatever reason chooses not to fully utilize it. Naming scenarios in this fashion is 
common in the literature. For example, Kreps and Wilson (1982a) delineate between "weak" and "strong" 
monopolists based on different payoff matricies. 
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about fmn-specific emissions, and thus provides a larger reward to firm 2 than in the previous 
scenario for behaving clean, and similarly punishes firm 2 more severely for behaving dirty. In 
the third scenario--called the "structured" information scenario-we assume that the consumer 
has available the highest quality information possible about firm-specific emissions. He thus 
greatly rewards firm 2 for behaving clean (again, in a relative sense), and greatly punishes firm 2 
for behaving dirty. In this case, the consumer chooses a relatively low value for ¢ when he 
believes firm 2 is clean and firm 2 behaves clean (thus providing firm 2 with a high reward), and 
he chooses a relatively high value for ¢ when he believes firm 2 is dirty and firm 2 behaves dirty 
(thus providing firm 2 with a high punishment). 
The specific values of ¢ that we use to delineate these three scenarios are provided in 
Table 6. Recall that cell (1r2 2, U2) corresponds to the outcome when the consumer believes 
firm 2 is clean and firm 2, in fact, behaves clean that period. This might be termed the "reward" 
cell. Thus, as the value of ¢ decreases in his utility function, the consumer is effectively 
rewarding firm 2 more and more for what he believes is clean behavior. Likewise, recall that cell 
( 1r23, U3) corresponds to the outcome when the consumer believes firm 2 is dirty and firm 2 in 
fact behaves dirty that period. This might be termed the "punishment" cell. Thus, as the value of 
¢ increases in his utility function, the consumer is effectively punishing firm 2 more and more 
for what he believes is dirty behavior. Finally, for both scenarios we assume that the value of ¢ 
associated with cell (1r21, Ul) is constant at 0.48, and that the value of ¢ associated with cell (1r2 4, 
if) is 0.5.28 
28The values for ¢ that correspond to cells (7r2 2, if) and ( 7r/, U3) were purposefully chosen to be in a tight 
band around 0.5. Obviously, as this band widens the corresponding magnitudes of the stage game payoffs that 
distinguish the three information scenarios also widen. 
24 
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
Before presenting the results for each of the three scenarios, it is instructive to briefly 
examine the consumer's and firm 2's sequential strategies that result for one of the scenarios. 
Consider the Unstructured Information scenario. Given the parameter values contained in 
Tables 5 and 6, Table 7 presents the consumer's and firm 2' s corresponding equilibrium payoffs 
for this scenario.29 Note that in this game, the consumer's dominant strategy is to believe that 
finn 2 is dirty, while firm 2's optimal strategy is to behave dirty when believed dirty and to 
behave clean when believed clean (i.e., game AC in Table 2). 
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE] 
Using (2b), firm 2's expected final-period Tpayoffis: 
E-/~) = zrtY-/194.42) + (1 -YT)(194.41)] + (1 - zT)LY-/179) + (1 - YT)(187)] 
which implies 
if ZT > 0.998 
if ZT = 0.998 
if ZT < 0.998 
(27) 
(28) 
Thus, as (28) indicates, even without common knowledge it is highly unlikely that firm 2 
will behave clean in period T. Using (2a), the consumer's expected final-period Tpayoffis: 
E-/U) = z:rI:p-/0.03) + (1 - PT)(O.Ol)] + (1 - zT)[p-/0.05) + (1 - PT)(0.02)] 
= z-/-O.Ol PI - 0.01) + 0.06 PT+ 0.02, (29) 
29Because both the consumer's and fIrms' respective maximization problems are quasi-concave programs, 
suffIcient second-order conditions for optimality are naturally met. 
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which implies Zr = 0, in tum implying that Yr = 0 and E/. 7(2) = 187 in equilibrium. It is 
straightforward to show that this same result occurs in each prior period. Thus, 
if Zt > 0.998 
if Zt = 0.998 'lit, 
if Zt < 0.998 
implying that in equilibrium Zt = 0 and Yt = 0 V t. In other words, the sequential equilibrium that 
evolves from this repeated game is the consumer believing firm 2 is behaving dirty in every 
period, while firm 2 in fact behaves dirty. This suggests that unstructured information may not 
be strong enough to move the consumer and a dirty firm away from noncooperation. 
Table 8 presents firm 2' s sequential equilibria strategies for each of the three information 
scenarios considered in this section. These strategies were determined using exactly the same 
approach as that used above for the Unstructured Information scenario. In contrast with the 
Unstructured Information scenario, both the Intermediate and Structured Information scenarios 
induce firm 2 to behave clean in each period t of the repeated game. This marked shift in fum 
2's behavior is predicated on a relatively small change in the consumer's choice of c/J, indicating 
that a dirty firm's emissions may be very responsive to how consumers utilize publicly provided 
information. This is further good news for those nations considering a shift away from the 
regulator-centric paradigm of pollution control. 
[INSERT TABLE 8] 
Additional results from our simulations of the calibrated model concern the levels of 
aggregate emissions and consumer welfare as the reward/punishment scheme adopted by the 
consumer changes. Table 9 contains the period-by-period aggregate emissions and welfare levels 
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associated with each of three scenarios presented in this paper. Thus, aggregate emissions and 
consumer welfare over T periods is T times the levels reported in Table 9. 
[INSERT TABLE 9 HERE] 
Aggregate emissions steadily decline and consumer welfare steadily increases as we 
move from the unstructured to the structured infonnation scenario. This pattern supports the 
hypothesis that stronger reward/punishment schemes adopted by consumers (based upon the 
provision of more and better infonnation about finn-level emissions) leads to lower aggregate 
emissions. We therefore find no support for the argument made by Mattoo and Singh (1994) that 
increased provision of public infonnation can lead to increased emissions.3D 
6. Summary and Policy Implications 
The preceding analysis has demonstrated that consumers' use of infonnation to fonn 
reputations of dirty finns is a potentially powerful tool (or, "market mechanism") in controlling 
pollution. When a consumer and a finn each follow strategies that are consistent with each 
other's behaviors, we find that a finn which has the option of behaving dirty (i.e. it may choose 
not to internalize its contribution to an aggregate externality) nonetheless has a positive 
probability of playing clean in each period of a finite game. What drives this result is the two-
fold assumption that consumers in fact utilize infonnation provided to them, say by a regulatory 
agency, and that finns care about their environmental reputations. The latter assumption is 
highly plausible, especially as more and more infonnation is made public about finns' 
30Mattoo and Singh base their analysis upon the peculiar condition that equilibrium can admit excess 
demand and supply in differentiated markets as long as demand and supply are balanced in the aggregate. 
Proceeding from such a condition it is tautological that emissions will tend to increase if there continues to be excess 
demand in the market for the dirty good after the provision of public information. But, then, this is not necessarily a 
consequence of the provision of public information. 
environmental perfonnances, and environmental problems become more and more a concern 
nationwide. The fonner assumption, however, is not as plausible. 
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Without a concerted effort on the part of regulatory agencies such as the EPA and the 
state Departments of Environmental Quality (DEQ's) to both provide consumers with 
infonnation and assist them in using it, it is doubtful that enough consumers can provoke dirty 
finns into self-regulation simply by force of reputation. Consumers will require more 
infonnation than that presently provided by the EPA and the various state DEQ websites; 
particularly infonnation about smaller finns than those typically reported on, and infonnation 
concerning a wider scope of pollutants. Further, the infonnation will have to be disseminated in 
more accessible fonnats, such as through a product labeling scheme similar to that used in 
several OECD countries, or through other fonns of mass advertising. 
Perhaps the most encouraging example in the United States of how reputations are being 
fonned among the general public is the social-investment movement. Total assets under 
management of social-investment mutual funds, and the number of such funds themselves, has 
skyrocketed during the past few years. In essence, these funds act as clearinghouses of 
infonnation for investors, so that investors are not required to invest time themselves in building 
their own reputations of dirty finns. In this case, finns are induced to care about their reputations 
through input-market effects, rather than through product-market effects. One frontier for future 
research is therefore to continue the investigation of the effectiveness of a finn's reputation 
among investors in inducing finns to self-regulate their pollution emissions, along the lines of 
Konar and Cohen (1997). The main question addressed in this paper would then be re-worded 
as, "To what extent must investors reward and punish dirty finns before the finns will choose 
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self-regulation as their dominant strategies?" In the end, reputations formed by investors may be 
a more cost-effective means of inducing self-regulation than those formed by consumers. But 
cost-effectiveness itself is ultimately a frontier of future empirical research. Certainly, if 
consumers' reputations are to have a similar effect, some kind of product-market clearinghouse 
will have to be established to facilitate the dissemination of environmental information, as it has 
for input markets. 
Perhaps the most important frontier for future research is an empirical investigation of 
this paper's theoretical propositions. For instance, while it is important to know that a 
consumer's reward/punishment scheme does not necessarily have to be strong-in a theoretical 
sense - in order to induce a dirty firm to become clean (e.g., based strictly on "structured" 
information, as in Section 5 of this paper), it is quite another to find empirical justification for 
such a claim. To our knowledge, a rich enough data set that tracks consumer choices between 
clean and dirty firms over time does not yet exist. Although it is a priori difficult to classify 
current consumer use of the TRI data as either "weak" or "strong," it seems reasonable to assume 
that consumers are not yet making strong use of the data, no matter how strength is defined. 
However, if in fact there exists a negative correlation between the passage of time (as a proxy for 
reputation) on the one hand, and firm emissions on the other, then this might suggest that strong 
reward/punishment schemes on the part of consumers are not necessarily required to change dirty 
firm behavior. 
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Table 1. The Model's Strategic Fonn. 
Consumer 
Believes finn is dirty Believes finn is clean 
Firm Behaves clean 
Behaves dirty 
Table 2. The Possible Strategies for the Consumer and the Finn. 
Consumer Firm 
Strategy Description Strategy Description 
A Always believe fIrm is dirty. A Always behave dirty. 
B Always believe fIrm is clean. B Always behave clean. 
C Believe fInn is dirty when it C Behave dirty when believed 
behaves dirty, and it is clean dirty, and behave clean when 
when it behaves clean. believed clean. 
D Believe fIrm is clean when it D Behave dirty when believed 
behaves dirty, and it is dirty clean, and behave clean when 
when it behaves clean. believed dirty. 
E Indifferent when fIrm behaves E Indifferent when believed 
dirty, and believe fIrm is clean dirty, and behave clean when 
when it behaves clean. believed clean. 
F Indifferent when fIrm behaves F Indifferent when believed 
dirty, and believe fInn is dirty dirty, and behave dirty when 
when it behaves clean. believed clean. 
G Indifferent when fInn behaves G Indifferent when believed 
clean, and believe fInn is dirty clean, and behave dirty when 
when it behaves dirty. believed dirty. 
H Indifferent when fInn behaves H Indifferent when believed 
clean, and believe fInn is clean clean, and behave clean when 
when it behaves dirty. believed dirty. 
I Complete indifference. I Complete indifference. 
Firm 
Firm 
Table 3. Stage Game CA Payoffs for the Consumer and Firm.3! 
Behaves clean 
Behaves dirty 
Consumer 
Believes firm is dirty 
(0,0) 
(1, 1) 
Believes firm is clean 
(0, 1) 
(1, 0) 
Table 4. Stage Game CC Payoffs for the Consumer and Firm. 
Behaves clean 
Behaves dirty 
Consumer 
Believes firm is dirty 
(0,0) 
(1, 1) 
Believes firm is clean 
(1, 1) 
(0,0) 
Table 5. Parameter Values. 
Parameters Values 
ct 1 
t 0.75 
r] 0.05 
y 100 
w 1 
31Recall that the first number in the parentheses in each cell corresponds to the fIrm's payoff, while the 
second number in the parentheses corresponds to the consumer's payoff. 
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Table 6. Values for ¢. 
Scenario 
Unstructured Info. Intermediate Info. 
0.50 
0.51 
0.48 
0.52 
Structured Info. 
0.46 
0.55 
Table 7. Stage Game Payoffs Under the Unstructured Information Scenario. 
Firm Behaves clean 
Behaves dirty 
Consumer 
Believes firm is dirty 
(179, 0.05) 
(187, 0.02) 
Believes firm is clean 
(194.42, 0.03) 
(194.41, 0.01) 
Table 8. Simulation Results for Firm 2's Sequential-Equilibrium Strategies. 
Information Scenario Firm 2's Strategy 
Unstructured Behave dirty in each period t. 
Intermediate Behave clean in each period t. 
Structured Behave clean in each period t. 
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Table 9. Simulation Results for Firm 2's Period-By-Period 
Level of Pollution Emissions and Consumer Welfare. 
Information Scenarios Firm 2's Period-by-Period 
Level of Emissions 
Unstructured 27.93 
Intermediate 27.86 
Structured 27.80 
Consumer Welfare 
0.02 
0.05 
0.11 
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